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Abstract—Secure function evaluation (SFE) is the process of 
computing a function (or running an algorithm) on some data, 
while keeping the input, output and intermediate results hidden 
from the environment in which the function is evaluated. This 
can be done using fully homomorphic encryption, Yao's garbled 
circuits or secure multiparty computation. Applications are 
manifold, most prominently the outsourcing of computations to 
cloud service providers, where data is to be manipulated and 
processed in full confidentiality. Today, one of the most 
intensively studied solutions to SFE is fully homomorphic 
encryption (FHE). Ever since the first such systems have been 
discovered in 2009, and despite much progress, FHE still remains 
inefficient and difficult to implement practically. Similar 
concerns apply to garbled circuits and (generic) multiparty 
computation protocols. In this work, we introduce the concept of 
a blind Turing-machine, which uses simple homomorphic 
encryption (an extension of ElGamal encryption) to process 
ciphertexts in the way as standard Turing-machines do, thus 
achieving computability of any function in total privacy. 
Remarkably, this shows that fully homomorphic encryption is 
indeed an overly strong primitive to do SFE, as group 
homomorphic encryption with equality check is already 
sufficient. Moreover, the technique is easy to implement and 
perhaps opens the door to efficient private computations on 
nowadays computing machinery, requiring only simple changes 
to well-established computer architectures. 
Keywords—secure function evaluation; homomorphic 
encryption; chosen ciphertext security; cloud computing 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many security systems at some point employ trusted parties 
(e.g., trust-centers, smartcards) to perform computations on 
secret (confidential) information. Trying to get rid of such 
trusted instances in a security system is often difficult (if not 
impossible), and one possible solution is to emulate the trusted 
party by a collection of instances rather than a single one. Such 
distributed computations usually rely on secret-sharing 
techniques, capable of function evaluation such that only a 
permitted specified set of coalitions can learn any secret 
information or results of the computation. The work of 
Gennaro[1][2] and [3]made significant contributions to the 
theory in this area known as secure multiparty computation 
(SMC). Its practical usefulness, however, is somewhat limited, 
as it isoften tied to a vast communication effort and intricate 
additional security precautions (e.g., pairwise confidential 
channels, broadcast channels, etc.). Furthermore, it is a special 
case ofthe more general problem known as secure function 
evaluation (SFE), in which a single (potentially malicious) 
instance is made to compute some function on externally 
supplied (potentially encrypted) inputs. This is the area where 
this work falls into, and on which we will exclusively 
concentrate us in the following.Commoncomputational models 
upon which SFE is based are Turing-machines or circuits, 
where the appropriateness of each model depends on the details 
of the SFE technique. We will base our construction on Turing-
machines, drawing strongly from circuit complexity models to 
ease life in cryptographic matters.  
Related work: One famous approach to SFE, leaving the 
computations with a single not necessarily trusted entity,is 
provided by Yao's garbled circuits (GC) [4]. Here, the 
computational model are circuits, which are good for hardware-
implementation (as well as theoretical treatment), yet 
somewhat difficult to apply in a generic fashion to handle 
inputs of arbitrary size. Despite much progress in this direction 
[5]-[7] as well as on applications of GC for SMC [8], [9], only 
uniform circuits can be set up effectively in practice, in which 
case they are essentially equivalent to Turing-machines. 
However, there is so far no analogous concept of a garbled 
Turing-machine. 
Without doubt, the most powerful (and recent) solution to 
SFE is fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). In brief, this is 
(or can be) a trapdoor one-way automorphism          
          where   is a ring or a field, and  is the key-
space. We denote the encryption        of  under the key 
 as       hereafter. The central property of FHE is its 
compatibility with arithmetic operations in the sense that for 
any two plaintexts       and any key  , we get        
                 and                  
      . That is, arithmetic manipulations done to ciphertexts 
identically apply to the underlying plaintexts. It is easy to 
imagine that such an encryption enables any kind of data 
processing given ciphertexts only, which is exactly what secure 
function evaluation means.While it is usually simple to get a 
homomorphic property w.r.t. addition or multiplication (e.g., 
standard encryptions such as RSA or ElGamal are 
multiplicatively homomorphic; in general group 
homomorphic), homomorphy w.r.t. both operations is intricate 
and has only recently been achieved [10]. Since this 
breakthrough, FHE has evolved into a major research branch of 
cryptography, with many interesting results [11]-[18]. 
Our contribution in this work is to show that despite the 
theoretical beauty of FHE, it is nevertheless an overly strong 
primitive for secure function evaluation. To this end, we 
investigate the weaker notion of public-key encryption with 
equality check (PKEET) [19], and show how the functionality 
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of a basic (single two-way infinite tape) Turing-machine can be 
implemented with simple homomorphic encryption that allows 
equality checks. We call the resulting computing model a blind 
Turing-machine, since it works on encrypted tape content only, 
doing its transitions by virtue of equality checks, and 
manipulating the tape content using the homomorphic 
properties of the encryption in charge. Hence, the TM does not 
see (in plaintext) any of the content that it processes. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: we start from 
the PKEET system of [19], which is secure under adaptive 
chosen ciphertext attacks, and as such cannot be in any sense 
homomorphic. To restore the homomorphic property in the 
framework of [19], we describe a generic technique (based on 
[19]) to construct a homomorphic public-key encryption with 
equality check (hereafter abbreviated as HPKEET) from any 
additively homomorphic encryption. We prove it secure under 
(non-adaptive) chosen ciphertext attacks (stronger notions are 
provably unachievable for any homomorphic encryption in 
general). Section II formally introduces the respective models, 
with the construction of HPKEET and its security analysis to 
follow in section III. Blind Turing-machines (BTM) are 
introduced in section IV, based on a brief review of how 
conventional Turing-machines (TM) are formally defined. 
Security and complexity of computations on such blind TM are 
studied along a sequence of subsections. 
In section VII we report on a practical implementation of 
the encryption. Remarks on future work and open problems 
follow in section VIII. 
II. DEFINITIONS 
We write  
 
   to denote a uniformly random draw of an 
element   from a set  . We let     denote the length of   in bits 
(assuming a canonical string representation, if   is a group 
element). Our treatment in the following is non-uniform. That 
is, we consider the complexity of an algorithm as the size, i.e. 
the number of gates, of a circuit representing the algorithm. To 
handle inputs of varying length, a circuit (e.g., adversary) of 
complexity   is thus to be understood as a sequence of circuits 
(circuit family)        , whose size is a function     , 
whenever the circuit    has   input gates. Besides circuit 
complexity, section V will heavily rest on time-complexity 
considerations. To distinguish the two notions from each other, 
we will refer to circuit complexity simply as complexity, as 
opposed to time-complexity, always carrying the prefix „time“. 
To further clarify which concept is in charge, we will speak of 
circuits to mean circuit families and circuit complexity, and 
algorithms when we consider time-complexities. 
A public-key encryption scheme is a triple of 
circuits       . The circuit   generates the secret and public 
key pair, denoted as          . Forhomomorphy, assume 
that the encryption function           is defined on a 
cyclic plaintext group       , keyspace        
  and 
cyclic ciphertext group       . Abbreviating the encryption of a 
plaintext   under the public key   by        , we require 
group homomorphy under identical public keys, i.e., 
                            for all         . 
The function           decrypts a ciphertext   upon 
given the secret key   ; denoted as       . 
Security of an encryption is commonly defined in terms of 
indistinguishable ciphertexts under differently strong attack 
scenarios. However, an indistinguishability requirement is 
obviously useless once we endow an encryption with 
comparison facilities for plaintexts that work on ciphertexts 
only (as we attempt here). To fix this, we additionally introduce 
an authorization function (circuit) that outputs a (secret) 
comparison key, hereafter called a token, which enables 
comparisons, while any party not knowing the token will be 
unable to distinguish any two given ciphertexts. In that sense, 
we consider two different kinds of attacker (following the 
framework of [19]), both of which are given all system 
parameters and public keys: 
Type 1 attacker: This one can do ciphertext comparisons, 
in which case we can only ensure the cipher to be one-way but 
not indistinguishable. 
Type 2 attacker: This one does not have the authorization 
token to do comparisons, thus security against this (weaker) 
attacker can properly be defined in terms of 
indistinguishability. 
Onewayness under chosen-ciphertext attacks is defined in 
the usual way by giving oracle access to        to the attacker 
 , indicated as        , and engaging in the following 
experiment    
  -    
  with the challenger. 
Setup phase: the challenger creates         . 
Query phase: the attacker (adaptively) chooses a number 
of   ciphertexts       and retrieves           from the 
challenger for          . 
Challenge phase: challenger chooses a plaintext  that has 
not been returned in the query phase, and submits  
           to the adversary. 
Guess phase: attacker outputs a guess  . 
The advantage of       in      -    is 
          
                
                   
We call the encryption        -OW-CCA1-secure, if an 
adversary        of complexity    and submitting no more 
than   queries has an advantage    
  -    
         . 
Indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks is 
defined by the following experiment    
   -    
 . As before, 
we assume oracle access to decryptions under   : 
Setup phase: the challenger creates          . 
Query phase: the attacker (adaptively) chooses a number 
of   ciphertexts       and retrieves           from the 
challenger for          . 
Challenge phase: the attacker generates two messages 
       
      , where       and          . The 
challenger receivers     , chooses  
 
      , and returns 
          . 
Guess phase: attacker outputs a guess   . 
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The advantage of       in       -    is 
           
                  
 
 
   
We call the encryption        -IND-CCA1-secure, if an 
adversary        of complexity    and submitting no more 
than   queries has an advantage    
   -    
         . 
Comparisons can be done by allowing decryptions of either 
the plaintext or a hash-value thereof (not revealing the plaintext 
as such). To this end, we define a commitment-like hash-
function that acts on the same plaintext group as the encryption 
does. For security, we require the discrete logarithm problem to 
be difficult on this group. Formally, let      generate the 
group   . We call    a      -DL group, if 
         
 
       
             for all circuits 
  of complexity   . 
A. Asymptotic Security 
For generality, we give concrete security statements here in 
terms of the security parameters      , leaving their obvious 
respective asymptotic formulations aside. Throughout the rest 
of this work, we confine ourselves to stressing that all 
parameters, in the asymptotic formulation, would depend on a 
(common) security parameter     that usually controls key-
sizes, group structures or similar (consequently, it goes as a 
parameter into the key-generation circuit  ). As an example, 
the asymptotic version of        -OW-CCA1 security would 
read as follows: for every polynomials           there is a 
negligible function 1      such that the encryption is 
                -OW-CCA1 secure. All results and 
definitions to follow can be restated in a similar manner. 
III. THE ENCRYPTION SCHEME 
Our encryption scheme will allow comparisons by attaching 
a keyed hash of the inner plaintext to the ciphertext, where the 
key for the hash is also encrypted2. Comparisons then need the 
permission by the originator of the ciphertext, who must 
provide the decryption key to disclose the hash-key. This key is 
obtained by an authorization functionAut. The comparison 
procedure com then simply compares the “decrypted“ hashes. 
To distinguish the components of our HPKEET-encryption 
scheme (KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Aut, Com) from that of the 
underlying OW-CCA1 and IND-CCA1 secure encryption 
       , we use a different notation hereafter. Moreover, we 
assume that the plaintext group    is such that DL-
commitments to      are well-defined; that is, we can 
compute    for a generator   of    and some value    . 
This is trivially satisfied for prime order groups over the 
integers (say, if          for some prime  ), and 
                                                        
1
Negligibility of a function   is defined in the usual way, by requiring for 
every     the existence of a constant      so that      
 
  
 as soon as 
    . 
2
This proposal is as well found in [19], where it is instantiated in an insecure 
manner under an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack scenario (CCA2). We 
consider a similar instantiation (equally well not IND-CCA2 secure), but 
prove it secure in the weaker model of (non-adaptive) chosen-ciphertext 
attacks (IND-CCA1). 
requires only simple additional measures in elliptic curve 
settings. 
KeyGen: Create            and            . Put 
            and             . Choose two (distinct) 
generators    of   . The system parameters globally known to 
all instances are       and  . 
Enc: Given the message    , the encryption is 
         
  by choosing an integer        and returning 
                    
             . 
Dec: If the given ciphertext   cannot be parsed as an 
element              
 , return  . Otherwise, put 
             
           and verify if    
   
 
  
 
  Output   upon a match, and   otherwise. 
Aut: To authorize a third party to do comparisons, Aut 
extracts and returns the token       from the secret key 
            . 
Com: Given a token   and two (syntactically correct) 
ciphertexts               
    
    
     
 , compute   
        
       
   and output the result of the comparison  
     
     
     
 
 in  . 
Notice that a trivial instantiation of the above scheme by a 
symmetric (e.g., AES) or deterministic (e.g. plain RSA) 
encryption would be insecure. Even though comparisons are 
easy in that case (ciphertext equality implies plaintext 
equality), such a scheme would not be indistinguishable, and 
thus fail to achieve the security that we desire against a type 2 
attacker. 
A. Homomorphy 
Let two ciphertexts              
               for 
      be given, and consider their component-wise product in 
      , which is 
                        
            
                
              
                      
 
This is a valid ciphertext if and only if the underlying 
encryption         is additively homomorphic. Unfortunately, 
we cannot instantiate         as a Paillier-encryption, since 
this works over a composite modulus      for which    is 
not cyclic (in general). An “almost” compatible IND-CCA1 
secure encryption, except for its multiplicative homomorphy, is 
found in Damgårds version of ElGamal encryption [20]. 
Changing the multiplicative homomorphic property of 
ElGamal encryption into an additive one is easy by encrypting 
commitments    instead of , if the plaintext space is only of 
“tractably small size” (e.g., polynomial size in the security 
parameter) to let us recover  from    efficiently. While this 
requirement is easily met in our application to Turing-
machines, we stress that care has to be taken in the encoding of 
  in order to avoid trial opening of commitments (and thus 
breaking the encryption) during an invocation of Com, if the 
token (secret key to decrypt the randomizer) is available 
(through an invocation of Aut). We take a closer look at this 
now. 
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B. Security Analysis 
We start with a (well-known) necessary condition for 
security to avoid brute-force plaintext search. 
1) Offline Message Recovery 
Plaintext discovery by trial encryptions and checking 
equality with the given ciphertext is essentially unavoidable, 
but can be made infeasible if the plaintexts have high min-
entropy: recall that a random plaintext   over a set    has 
min-entropy        , if   is the largest number such that 
            for all    . 
Lemma 1. If an encryption function   is such that for 
any circuit   of complexity  , we have            
        for any given ciphertext         , then the 
plaintext  has min-entropy 
 
                  
    
     
     (1) 
Where   is the complexity of computing an encryption, 
and       measures how much circuitry is required to string-
compare two ciphertexts. 
Proof.If the lemma were wrong, then a circuit can do 
encryptions (of complexity    ) and comparisons (of 
complexity      ) to determine the correct plaintext. From the 
geometric distribution, it is easy to obtain the number of trials 
until the success probability becomes   . Constraining this 
number to be less than               (assuming the circuitry 
to be divided equally into blocks that do encryptions and 
comparisons), gives the stated min-entropy bound.   
Lemma 1 is a necessary yet insufficient condition for 
security. Its asymptotic counterpart (i.e.,            when 
  is the security parameter) is a standard requirement for 
security of deterministic or searchable encryption (cf. [21]) 
against polynomial time-bounded attackers. We establish 
security of the encryption as such in the next section, and 
postpone a discussion on how to practically assure condition 
(1) until section IV.B. 
2) Chosen Ciphertext Security 
As the encryption comes with comparison facilities, we 
modify the OW-CCA1 and IND-CCA1 games appropriately, 
by letting the attacker submit Aut-queries besides decryption 
requests. To distinguish the experiments concerning HPKEET 
from that on the underlying cipher        , we denote these 
extended versions as    
  -     
  and    
   -     
 , i.e., 
security under chosen ciphertexts and equality checks. The 
definition of    
  -     
  is the same as that of    
  -    
 , 
except for a slight modification in the query phase: 
     -     query phase: the attacker submits no more 
than   queries of the giving            for (adaptively) 
chosen ciphertexts   or      , for an authorization query. 
Obviously, we cannot apply the same change to 
      -     , so we define this experiment exactly identical to 
      -    . 
By construction, our encryption is a humble application of 
  on two stochastically independent quantities and  , along 
with a product of two commitments thereof. Hence, the 
reductions establish only a slight advantage over that in 
breaking        . Formally, we have 
Lemma 2. Let         be defined over an        
         -DL-group    of plaintexts, where     is the 
maximum complexity of an encryption or decryption, and 
     is the total complexity of one exponentiation with 
inversion and multiplication in   . If         is       
                 -OW-CCA1-secure, then the 
corresponding HPKEET scheme is            -OW-
CCA1-secure. 
Proof.Suppose the existence of an attacker  with advantage 
   
  -     
                and complexity    and making   
queries. We construct an attacker    that wins    
  -    
  as 
follows: given         from    
  -    
 ,    sets 
                  and obtains             on its own. 
It then simulates    
  -     
 for , answering the  -th query 
(for          ) as follows: 
 Dec-queries on an incoming HPKEET ciphertext   
                 are forwarded as decryption challenges 
        to the OW-CCA1 challenger, which returns 
                       . Then,    goes on by 
decrypting      using its own secret key     into 
               , and returns    if  
    
 
     in 
  , and   otherwise. We stress that the keypairs 
          and           for encrypting the payload 
and the randomizer are in any case chosen stochastically 
independent. Hence,    actually acts properly if it 
generates           by itself, and receives the other 
pair           from an external source (the OW-CCA1 
challenger). 
 Aut-queries are answered faithfully by responding with 
   . 
In the challenge phase, the complexity of   is thus 
dominated by simulations of half of the decryption of 
challenges from , which is             . 
To ease notation, let us incorporate all information from the 
query phase of    
  -     
  into the circuit , which in the 
guess phase of    
  -     
  computes its output upon a given 
ciphertext    
    
    
             
            . Observe 
that   
 , in an information-theoretic sense, does not provide any 
information on   
 , and uniquely determines    from   
 . 
Therefore, in any    
  -     
  execution in which at least one 
Aut-query has been submitted, 
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for some circuit  . Obviously, one could convert from the 
inputs           
   to           
              (and 
back) by choosing (or decrypting) the randomizer   and doing 
(or inverting) the remaining operations. Hence, the complexity 
of   is bounded from above by           , where     and 
     are the complexities of an encryption/decryption 
(maximum thereof), and an exponentiation with inversion and 
multiplication in   . The advantage of   is the probability of 
guessing    correctly either from         or  
  alone, or 
from both. From the union bound and by assuming that   is an 
                -DL-group, we get 
                 
  
           extracted from        
              extracted from   
           
       
 
The complexity of    is thus                 
                              . 
In the challenge phase of     
  -    
  , upon incoming of 
         ,    can therefore run    in place of  , to 
discover  from the OW-CCA1 challenge          , with 
an advantage    
  -    
     contradicting the security of 
       .   
Likewise, we establish IND-CCA1-security of HPKEET by 
virtue of the following well-known concrete result on how 
indistinguishability implies semantic security. 
Lemma 3. If         has      -indistinguishable 
encryptions, and     has complexity     , then         
is             -semantically secure where          -
semantic security is defined as follows: for every 
distribution   over messages, every functions      
                 
   (of arbitrary complexity) and 
every circuit   of complexity    , there is another circuit 
   with complexity        so that 
                        
                       
 
Lemma 4. Let         be defined over a group    of 
plaintexts, where     bounds the complexity of an 
encryption or decryption, and      is the complexity of one 
exponentiation with inversion and multiplication in   . If 
        is                                 -IND-
CCA1-secure, then the corresponding HPKEET scheme is 
        -IND-CCA1-secure. 
Proof.Besides a few modifications that we describe now, 
the line of arguments is completely analogous as in the proof of 
Lemma 2, except for the important difference that the 
adversary is not allowed to issue Aut-queries in    
   -     
 . 
Assume an attacker  with   -advantage in    
   -     
 . The 
complexity of   during the challenge phase is (as before) 
            . Upon the incoming challenge            
in    
   -    
 ,   embeds it in a HPKEET ciphertext 
  
             , for    
 
 
   . Observe that a unique 
value      exists for which  
    
  
   . For   
  to be a 
valid HPKEET ciphertext,    should equal       
  , which is 
most likely not the case. We can fix this by exploiting the 
indistinguishability of encryptions under   as follows: as   is 
                     -IND-CCA1-secure,Lemma 3lets 
us replace   by another circuit    that has complexity 
                      –   and delivers the decision 
       
            so that 
               
    
 
      
      
                
    
 
        
(2) 
Observe that      
 
      
  
 for some random    , 
which means that this second parameter to    – in an 
information-theoretic sense – does not provide any additional 
information on  . So, there is another circuit    , no more 
complex than  , such that               
    
 
     
                   Now, we can construct an attacker 
  that wins the IND-CCA1 game as follows:   invokes    
on input of the IND-CCA1 challenge   , and output whatever 
    guesses. Inequality (2) tells that the result of    differs 
from that of   (on a syntactically correct input) with a 
probability of less than  . Moreover,  would by assumption 
guess correctly with an advantage of at least   . So by the 
second triangle inequality, and with the abbreviation   
          
    
 
      
   , we get 
               
 
 
 
                      
                                                
           
 
where     has complexity                        
  ,taking at most   queries, which contradicts the assumed 
IND-CCA1-security of  . 
IV. BLIND TURING-MACHINES 
Informally, a blind Turing-machine (BTM) is a normal TM, 
having its tape alphabet and transition function encrypted under 
a homomorphic public-key encryption with plaintext equality 
checking. The transition between states is made by 
homomorphic manipulations, and the choice of the current 
transition is made upon plaintext comparisons. We describe the 
construction over a sequence of subsections to follow. 
A. Definitions 
We start with a standard two-way infinite tape Turing-
machine           , working over a tape alphabet   with 
  being its state-space (including the halting state), and     
being the initial state. The mapping   describes the state 
transitions in terms of transforming configurations of the TM to 
one another. A configuration is a tuple                
              , describing the fact that the machine is 
currently in state    , with symbol     under its head, and 
with       
  being the words to the left- and right of the 
head. The transition function               is a finite set 
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of transformations                             , i.e.,   
moves to state   and modifies the tape content toward        
and   . Without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to 
deterministic TM here, as there is no conceptual difference in 
the nondeterministic case, except that we work on a transition 
relation rather than a function (as will become clear below, the 
necessary changes to define blind nondeterministic TM are all 
obvious). 
We abbreviate configurations as   and write       as a 
shorthand of         . A computation of   on an initial 
configuration    is a finite sequence of configurations    
                 that ends in a halting state     
and output configuration   . The number   of steps is called 
the machine's time-complexity, which normally depends on the 
size of the input (polynomial mostly, if we are after efficient 
algorithms). 
Notice that for our purposes, we do not distinguish moving 
steps (where only the head is relocated) from substitution steps 
(in which the current symbol on the tape is replaced by 
something else). Also note that it is difficult to hide the head 
movements from the execution environment of the TM (e.g., a 
universal TM), yet it is necessary to “decorrelate” the head 
movement pattern from the tape content to achieve 
confidentiality of the overall computation. Otherwise, the 
movement of the TM discloses the tape content length and 
perhaps even reveals the current action that is been carried out 
(by virtue of some characteristic moving sequences, as would 
perhaps be the case for pen-and-paper multiplication or 
division by repeated subtraction which reveals the quotient via 
counting the number of subtractions, regardless of whether or 
not they are encrypted). 
In section V, we will look at necessary precautions to 
prevent leakage of information from the Turing-machines head 
movements alone (quasi as a side-channel to the data as such). 
Note that similar concerns may apply to garbled circuits as 
well, as the way in which circuit gates (whether or not they are 
garbled) are interconnected may already leak partial 
information about the circuit's potential functionality. Still, we 
emphasize that our main goal in this work is to protect the data 
being processed. Hiding the algorithm itself from the execution 
environment is subject of future considerations and outside the 
scope of this current work. 
B. Encoding of States and Tape-Symbols 
Take a conventional TM            . Let HPKEET 
operate on the plaintext space    and ciphertext space   , and 
fix an (invertible) encoding          , so that we can 
encrypt both, the state and current tape symbol. 
Computations are usually done over relatively small 
alphabet, say bits         ) or radix-10 numbers (   
       ). Moreover, the number of states can be expected to 
be feasibly small as well (otherwise, the representation of  
could not be handled by the universal TM in feasible time). 
Hence, if       
     for some security parameter  , then 
high min-entropy in the sense of (1) can be assured by 
sufficiently large   and by assigning random and unique 
representatives from    to each element of    , in order to 
thwart trial decryptions succeeding in polynomial time. 
C. Construction 
Our blind TM works over ciphertexts only, and does its 
transitions using a proper „encryption“ of the original state 
transition function in  . To this end, we extend   toward 
                 and define the blind TM as the pair 
              . Here, the -accent is used to denote 
the „encrypted“counterparts of the respective elements in 's 
description. We stress that the description is technically 
complete but to this extent insecure, as the head movement 
pattern may leak information about the tape content. For the 
sake of a complete description at this point, however, we 
postpone the necessary details on security to section V. A blind 
TM works exactly as a normal TM, but employs HPKEET to 
do transitions over encrypted configurations as follows: 
1) Encrypted configurations: given a configuration   
            of , the respective encrypted configuration 
  (under the public key   , which we omit in the following 
to simplify our notation), is defined as 
                                
Where        are the encryptions of the tape content under 
      in electronic codebook mode. 
2) Transition functions: for each pair of consecutive 
configurations             
                    
of , the transition function    for the blind TM is created 
from   as 
                     
              
             
Where         and         , both computed in 
      . So, unlike the transition of the TM, a blind TM 
encrypts only the “difference” between the current and next 
configuration, in order to enforce re-randomization via 
homomorphic manipulations on the ciphertexts. Hence, 
actually doing a transition is now a two-step process: 
a) We invoke Com with the token           on the 
current (encrypted) configuration   of the BTM to match the 
states and symbols, and retrieve     
b) We create the new configuration    from the current 
one                             by computing in 
      , 
                           
          
                
so as to resemble 's original move via the homomorphic 
properties of Enc, which is easily verified to be 
                  
                
  
             
              
      
 
Doing tape manipulations by other means than 
homomorphic transformations for the sake of stronger IND-
CCA2 security is potentially insecure, as we will discuss in a 
little more detail in section V.A. 
Based on this construction, it is a trivial matter to decrypt 
and recover the tape content by virtue of      , and we omit 
the details here. However, note that like in a setting of fully 
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homomorphic encryption, the state transitions require the token 
as an “evaluation key”. 
V. SECURITY OF BLIND COMPUTATIONS 
By construction, an execution of a BTM produces a 
sequence of encrypted configurations, enjoying a one-to-one 
correspondence to the respective sequence of configurations 
arising from an execution of  . However, to retain 
indistinguishability in experiment    
   -     
         , we ought to 
equalize the length of computations on inputs of equal length, 
and make the head movements indistinguishable over different 
inputs. To this end, we must transform the given Turing-
machine accordingly before turning it into a blind TM. 
To equalize the length of computations, we restrict the 
time-complexity bound of   to time-constructible functions. 
We say that a function       is time-constructible, if there 
is a Turing-machine  , which for every input   of length     
takes exactly        steps for its computation on   (not 
necessarily saying that it computes anything useful). For 
example, every polynomial function is time-constructible (but 
also exponential functions, sums, products and compositions of 
time-constructible functions retain this property). 
Furthermore, we must logically decouple the tape content 
from the head movement pattern to avoid leakage of 
information via tracking what the head of the blind TM does. 
Turing-machines whose head movements are a function of the 
time only (hence independent of the tape content) are called 
oblivious TM. Besides theoretical interest in these for the sake 
of constructing circuits, the following well-known theorem will 
help to establish security of blind computations: 
Theorem 1. (Pippenger and Fischer [22]) Any Turing-
machine that runs in time   can be simulated by an 
oblivious Turing-machine in time         . 
A naive yet constructive approach to create an oblivious 
TM from a given one is to mark where the head of the tape is 
and then scan the tape to locate the head marker in each step. 
This yields a suboptimal time bound of       for a running 
time of   on the original TM, and Theorem 1 gives in fact the 
optimal bound. 
So, given a Turing-machine  whose time-complexity is a 
time-constructible function, we first transform   into an 
oblivious Turing-machine   , running in time   , which is 
again time-constructible by some Turing-machine   . Then, 
we let our blind TM run   in parallel to   on a second tape, 
so as to equalize the length of its computation, while running 
the oblivious TM   to do the actual computation with head 
movements that are independent of the data. This proves the 
following (intermediate nevertheless important) statement: 
Theorem 2. Let   be a Turing-machine, whose time 
complexity   is a time-constructible function. Then there 
exists a functionally equivalent Turing-machine   with the 
following property: given any two input words        of 
the same length          , a computation of    takes 
identical head movements on both,    and  . 
We can now turn to the task of lifting security assurances 
that hold for HPKEET towards security for an entire 
computation on a blind oblivious Turing-machine. Notice that 
so far, we considered security only for one message to be 
deciphered (as in    
  -       
 ) or recognized (from two given 
ones, as in    
   -       
 ). Security of a computation of a blind 
TM, however, requires a slight change to the experiments, in 
the sense that the challenge-phase in both games now itself is 
repeated a number of times that equals the time-complexity3   
of the underlying TM . Omitting the obvious details on the 
changes to the experiments here for brevity, let us directly turn 
to the respective security conclusions about HPKEET under    
many encryptions (each one of which arises along the 
emulation of  by a blind TM). 
Lemma 5. If HPKEET is        -IND-CCA1 secure 
for a single encryption, then it is                  -
IND-CCA1-secure for   encryptions, when      bounds the 
complexity of an encryption using HPKEET. Given the 
additional hypothesis that all random encrypted plaintexts 
have high min-entropy in the sense of Lemma 1, then the 
system is also                  -OW-CCA1-secure for 
  encryptions. 
Proof (sketch).Indistinguishability is shown by assuming 
the existence of a pair of (with probability      ) 
distinguishable  -tuples, and constructing hybrids to infer 
distinguishability in the single-message case with probability  . 
To this end, the distinguisher must emulate encryptions of no 
more than   (fixed) input messages, which enlarges the circuits 
(and yields the modified complexity-bounds). 
Onewayness is analyzed in a similar fashion, but is slightly 
simpler in the details: if a circuit  exists that upon input of   
ciphertexts ouputs one of the underlying plaintexts with 
probability     , then a new circuit   can be constructed to 
correctly answer a single challenge in    
  -       
   as follows: 
   randomly constructs     challenges    
         
  (adding 
the complexity          ), and invokes   on these 
challenges along with the given challenge        
 . With 
probability      ,   outputs one plaintext     from the   
ciphertexts. The chances for this to be   are 
 
 
    , 
contradicting the presumed OW-CCA1-security of HPKEET. 
We stress that onewayness is analyzed under the 
assumption that plaintext comparisons are possible. Therefore, 
we must assume high min-entropy of plaintexts, but cannot – 
and in fact do not – rest on a secret encoding (as described in 
section IV.B, as this would prevent the constructed machines 
from emulating proper encryptions (for the same reason, 
security of multiple encryptions fails in the secret key 
paradigm). For one-wayness to be assured, however (and 
fortunately), we do not need the encoding function in the 
technical arguments, since it is easy to generate random 
plaintexts whose min-entropy is high, even if these do not lie in 
the image of the encoding function that the honest party 
                                                        
3
Note that we do not need the space-complexity here, as we only need to 
count (bound) the number of modifications on the tape, which is bounded by 
the number of transitions, which is the time-complexity. 
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Fig. 1. Usage scheme of a blind Turing machine 
 
potentially uses. Under the additional min-entropy assumption, 
trial decryptions under a complexity bound   or better  
           ) are ruled out.   
Since a BTM basically produces a sequence of ciphertexts 
rather than a single one, it is a simple matter to instantiate the 
concrete security parameters of HPKEET based on Lemma 5. 
Theorem 3 assumes an oblivious Turing-machine to be 
available, which is assured by theorem Theorem 2. 
Theorem 3. Let  be an oblivious deterministic Turing-
machine with time-complexity   . If HPKEET is        -
OW-CCA1/IND-CCA1 secure, then the execution of the 
BTM constructed from  is                    -OW-
CCA1 secure. Furthermore, if    is time-constructible by 
another Turing-machine   , and if the oblivious BTM 
emulates (on two parallel tracks on its tape) the executions 
of both,   and   , stopping not before both executions 
terminate, then the execution is also                 
  -IND-CCA1 secure. 
Note that the apparently awkward mix of time-complexities 
and circuit complexities that appears in the above statement is 
actually meaningful, as the time-complexity merely determines 
how many ciphertexts an execution of an algorithm will 
provide to the cryptanalytic circuit (being an adversary of type 
1). Hence, the circuit complexity is somewhat proportional to 
the time-complexity. 
A. (In)security of Non-Homomorphic Transitions 
Encryptions with equality checks have been designed 
earlier [19] under the stronger notion of security against 
adaptive chosen ciphertexts (OW/IND-CCA2), which makes 
the encryption necessarily no longer homomorphic. Doing a 
transition by a humble replacement of the current tape 
ciphertext (encrypted symbol) by another is possible, yet 
removes the indistinguishability property of computations, 
because an (encrypted) symbol will always and necessarily be 
replaced by the same symbol, even if the computation itself is 
different. As a consequence, distinct plaintexts     , even 
if they are equally long, can be distinguished by an external 
instance upon different sequences of configurations. This can 
be done without the Aut-token, so that the computation would 
be insecure in our modified IND-CCA1 game (where the 
challenge phase includes multiple ciphertexts), and hence be 
insecure in an adaptive chosen-ciphertext scenario too. 
VI. PUTTING A BLIND TM TO WORK 
With the ground prepared in previous sections, we now 
give the complete picture of how a blind TM is created and 
envisioned to work in a potentially hostile environment. Let 
Alice be the honest party who wishes to have her data 
processed externally by a service provider (SP), having a public 
key     . Alice has her own secret/public key pair          . 
For the sake of practicality, let us assume that Alice uses 
Damgårds Version of ElGamal encryption for        , which 
is multiplicatively homomorphic and known to be CCA1-
secure [20]. To change the multiplicative homomorphic 
property into an additive one, Alice encrypts commitments    
instead of  , so that the HPKEET ciphertexts now take the 
form        
                . Assuming that the tape 
alphabet and number of states of her TM is feasibly small, 
recovering  from    is doable via lookup-tables. This adds 
an additional commit/decommit stage– shown dashed – in Fig. 
1, where the overall process is sketched, including locations of 
type 1 and type 2 adversaries. 
To have the SP process her data using a Turing-machine , 
while not learning anything about it, Alice performs the steps 
below. 
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1) She constructs an oblivious Turing-machine    that 
simulates  and on a second track/tape (obliviously) runs the 
machine   that takes exactly         steps to terminate for 
an input . This is to equalize the length of computations and 
head movements, regardless of the actual input. Call the 
resulting Turing-machine  (again, for simplicity). 
2) She constructs a blind Turing-machine   (code) from 
  as described in section IV. In doing so, she prepares the 
tape content (data) in a three steps: 
a) Encode each tape symbol and state by the function   
(to assure high min-entropy). 
b) Compute a commitment to each encoded state and 
symbol (to make the multiplicatively homomorphic encryption 
additively homomorphic; this step can be omitted if         
is additively homomorphic already, hence is shown dashed in 
Fig. 1). 
c) Encrypt the commitment under the public key    . 
3) She then sends all information to the service provider, 
potentially under the eyes of a type 2 attacker (cf. section II), 
against which Theorem 3 assures IND-CCA1 security. 
4) She submits the authorization token            in 
encrypted form (under the public key     ) to the service 
provider. Observe that the encrypted authorization token plays 
the role of something like a “license” to execute the given 
Turing-program, which would otherwise not be possible. 
 
The service provider executes the (encrypted) code, i.e., 
runs the blind Turing-machine on the encrypted tape content, 
and returns the encrypted tape content. While doing so, the SP 
may attempt to learn information from the execution of the 
BTM or the intermediate tape contents, in which case the SP 
becomes a type 1 attacker (cf. section II), against which 
Theorem 3assures OW-CCA1 security. 
The decryption of the ouput tape content is done as the 
encryption, only in reverse order, and by virtue of lookup tables 
to „decommit“ the decrypted commitments   , if there has 
been a commitment stage during the data preparation. The 
results are finally available after decoding (function    ). 
TABLE I.  COMPLEXITIES (IMPLEMENTATION-RELATED) 
Object/Action Complexity 
HPKEET 
KeyGen     
                
               
Aut      
Com           
blind TM 
transition selection        
Tape manipulation    
 
It is as well imaginable to let the program come from a 
different instance (entity in the system) as the data, given that 
both instances have agreed on a common encoding. This 
scenario would be, for example, useful when a software is 
provided by some vendor  , and shall be executed on data that 
the customer   owns, while protecting the intellectual property 
of the software vendor. If the execution of the software shall be 
outsourced to an SP, then   and   both submit their 
authorization tokens to the SP, while   and   agree on some 
common encoding to have the data compatible with the code. 
The SP then acts as usual to compute the results in privacy. The 
customer   can in that case only receive and decrypt the 
results, while being itself unable to execute the program as 
 lacks  's authorization (token). 
Another variation could be   encrypting the data under 
someone else's public key, to make the results available to 
another (third or fourth) party, which sees neither the input data 
nor the code. 
VII. PERFORMANCE AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS 
Assuming that the universal blind TM can select the proper 
transition based on the comparison facility of HPKEET, there 
would be no change in the asymptotic complexity of any 
function, whether it is computed on a conventional or blind 
Turing-Machine. More concretely, however, if a function 
                on a value          can be computed in 
time     , then a blind TM can compute the same result in 
time        , where   is a constant time bound needed to 
manipulate a state (via homomorphic operations on the 
ciphertext). A similar argument can be made for the change in 
the space-complexity, since tape symbols are now encoded as 
group elements, thus multiplying the required space as well by 
a concrete constant factor. 
Practically, a blind TM will need more time to complete its 
computation than a conventional TM since it has to find the 
proper transition based on invocations of Com. However, this 
can easily be accelerated if the selection is done by a hash-table 
taking the commitment    of the current tape symbol (being a 
HPKEET ciphertext           
            ) as the key for 
hashing. The transition can then be obtained from the hash-
table in roughly      steps, as the commitments can 
reasonably well be assumed as being uniformly distributed 
(hence ideal for hashing). 
Table I shows an overview of the actions involved when 
computing on ciphertexts, including actions that refer to 
HPKEET alone, taking into account that tape symbol 
commitments are encrypted, decrypted and compared (with the 
obvious changes to the formal descriptions given in section III). 
Here, the symbols e, i and m stand for exponentiation, 
inversion and multiplication inside the group   . The notation 
“    ” where           refers to   executions of the 
respective algorithm implementation of the encryption 
        underlying HPKEET. 
A (not very much optimized) Java implementation of our 
HPKEETcryptosystem based on Damgård's version of 
ElGamal encryption brought up some runtime estimates on a 
3.6 GHz computer with 8 GB RAM and 64 Bit Windows 7, as 
shown in Table II. The numbers are based on an average of 100 
invocations of Enc, Dec and Com for key lengths of  
                bit (according to current 
recommendations of the NIST and other bodies). The value for 
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a transition selection and tape manipulations give a rough 
estimate on how much slower a blind TM will run compared to 
a conventional TM (i.e., the factor   from the first paragraph). 
VIII. OUTLOOK AND OPEN PROBLEMS 
A practical topic of future work is the implementation of 
the concept within a practical computer architecture including 
assembler code and hardware. Challenges in such a practical 
implementation may concern the realization of other arithmetic 
operations such as integer divisions with remainder or logical 
manipulations. Results on this will be reported in companion 
and subsequent work. 
TABLE II.  BENCHMARK RESULTS (FOR         BEING DAMGÅRD-
ELGAMAL ENCRYPTION) 
Key size 256 bit 512 bit 2048 bit 
R
u
n
n
in
g
 t
im
e
 [
m
s]
 Enc                  
Dec                  
Com                  
BTM transition selection                 
BTM tape manipulation                    
The central contribution here is the insight that (only) 
additively homomorphic encryption can be used to construct 
Turing-machines that work on encrypted information only, by 
virtue of public-key encryption with equality check. Hence, this 
work adds a fourth alternative to existing approaches to secure 
function evaluation, besides fully homomorphic encryption, 
garbled circuits or secure multiparty computation. 
Unfortunately, the necessary ingredient of additively 
homomorphic encryption that is secure against chosen 
ciphertext attacks is surprisingly rare, while non-homomorphic 
encryptions under stronger security notions are better known. 
Taking a closer look at why we require homomorphy to do 
state transitions reveals that the weaker requirement of re-
randomization of ciphertexts is actually sufficient to invalidate 
the arguments of section V.A. An interesting open problem is 
thus finding encryptions that allow re-randomization of 
ciphertexts but are still CCA2-secure (if such encryptions 
exist). 
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